I am Indonesian, I am Pancasila. The slogan is a form of affirmation of the internalization of Pancasila values, which is manifested in an attitude of awareness of transcendence, both as Indonesian human identity and as citizens.
Diversity is the real face of Indonesia. In fact, perhaps since the middle of nowhere, the archipelago has been inhabited by various nations and ethnic groups. Of course mixing between diverse social groups through intermarriage is not an impossibility.
Eikjman’s research results prove this. Eikjman’s molecular biology research reveals the phenomenon of human genetic mixing in the archipelago. This phenomenon has occurred for tens of thousands of years through four migration periods.
Through genetic research, we can find out the ancestors of the Indonesian people. According to Eikjman, genetically Indonesian people are the product of the history of assimilation of tens of thousands of years of human history in the archipelago. What is important to note is that there is absolutely no single person who has pure genes who can claim to be Indonesian natives.
Notes on the diversity of Indonesia are also of concern to Indonesianists. Denys Lombard is worth mentioning as a reference. In “Nusa Jawa: Cross Culture” for example, a book with more than 1,000 pages with 2,500 footnotes, plus a 65-page bibliography and a 45-page glossary, Lombard writes in the book’s ‘Foreword’:
“There really is no place in this world except perhaps Central Asia which, like the Archipelago, is the place where almost all of the world’s great cultures exist, coexist, or merge into one.”
Denys Lombard further explains, for about a thousand years, from the 5th to the 15th centuries, Indian cultures influenced Sumatra, Java, and Bali. However, since the 13th century, and especially since the 15th century, two other influences began to be felt stronger, namely Islamic and Chinese culture . European civilization began to carve a strong influence since the 16th century.
Furthermore, Lombard underlined, the archipelago is not a “special case” of world history. But its geographical location in particular emphasizes its function as a cross, in the sense of a meeting point. This is where there is a great laboratory for studying the concepts of tradition, acculturation, and ethnicity which are currently becoming a trend in the humanities.
This Lombard thesis clearly implies the existence of pluralism values as a consequence of the specific geographical location of the archipelago.
No exception, Southeast Asian regional historian, Anthony Reid. Reid (2012) agrees that religious pluralism is a tradition in Asia, including Indonesia. Reid gave an example of Java as a concrete form of pluralism through the construction of two large temples, namely Borobudur (Buddhist) and Roro Jonggrang (Hinduism).
The founding parents are certainly aware of this sociocultural fact. The ideology of Pancasila is the fruit of their noble agreement in responding to the problems and challenges of pluralism. Indonesia is a multiethnic, multilingual, multicultural, and even multireligious or belief society.
As a result, the vision of the establishment of Indonesia is neither a religious state ( theocracy state ) nor a secular state ( secular state ). Indonesia was built with a vision as a “religious nation state” , a state of mutual cooperation, united in diversity, and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika.
Interestingly, even though at that time the discourse of pluralism and multiculturalism had not yet emerged in the discourse of the social sciences, the humanities, the ideological conception of Pancasila seemed to have been formulated as a form of anticipation of the times.
As is well known, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the world was marked by the blooming of the phenomenon of ” identity politics “. All over the world, identity politics which in fact reinforces the differences in collective identity mainly based on ethnicity, race, and religion is seen experiencing a tidal wave. Indonesia, without exception, does not appear to be fully immune to this attack after the New Order.
What we have to be wary of from this trend of identity politics is not the “natural” dialectic which is unavoidable in line with the diversity of identities, but the emergence of a strong belief that the identity of the group ( the self ) can only ‘exist’ and the history of its existence is maintained by eliminating the differences and existences that exist. other ( the other ).
Religious fundamentalism, regardless of religion, clearly carries the potential for the presence of such group identity beliefs. Moreover, when he then simultaneously synergizes with the agenda of practical political interests in the contestation for power, it often leads people to move further away from the climate of rationality.
Various studies conducted by several independent institutions show this tendency. Call it the SETARA Institute or the Wahid Institute, for example, for some time it has always been voicing the issue of the threat of SARA or the potential for division of the nation due to the phenomenon of strengthening identity politics.
Pancasila Revitalization Policy
The mistake of the New Order was to place the ideology of Pancasila as a “pseudo-religion.” In addition to building an aura of sacredness and a monolithic interpretation model, Pancasila is also positioned as an ideology that is closed to criticism and functions as the legitimacy of authoritarian and repressive and corrupt power.
The implication is that Pancasila has experienced distortions and a “crisis of legitimacy”. As a result, the phenomenon of de-Pancasila-ization emerged. This phenomenon was marked by the emergence of MPR Decree No. XVIII/MPR/1998 concerning the revocation of MPR Decree No. II/MPR/1978 concerning Guidelines for the Live and Practice of Pancasila (Ekapresetia Pancakarsa) and Stipulation on the Affirmation of Pancasila as the State Foundation.
P4 as content material and guidelines for the implementation of Pancasila is considered irrelevant to the development of state life and the situation of the times. However, TAP MPR No. XVIII/MPR/1998 actually carries the moral message of formulating a replacement for P4. But throughout the Reformation Era, unfortunately, the guidelines for implementing the new version of Pancasila were relatively never formulated.
This policy was followed by the dissolution of an institution, namely BP7 (Badan Pembinaan Pendidikan Implementing Guidelines for Living and Practicing Pancasila). Through Presidential Decree No. 27 of 1999 concerning the Revocation of Presidential Decree No. 10 of 1979 concerning the Agency for the Development of Education in the Implementation of Guidelines for the Live and Practice of Pancasila, the BP7 institution was officially dissolved on March 31, 1999.
Unfortunately, the marginalization of the Pancasila ideological discourse plus the absence of new guidelines for the implementation of Pancasila which are interpreted relevantly to the situation of the times, have actually made the religious position or at least religious articulation the only public discourse that bloomed throughout the Reformation Era.
However, unfortunately, in the sociological dimension, religious positions often have a latent function as a “divider” ( out group ) and at the same time a manifest function as an “glue” ( in group ). This is inseparable because in the political dimension, the instrumentalization of religion as an ideology often gives birth to an excessive spirit of religious fanaticism. Unfortunately, this attitude of fanaticism, borrowing the understanding of Yudi Latief (2008) is an attitude of rejecting rationality and legal regulations that can guarantee the continuity of public life.
The emergence of various radical movements that have occurred recently clearly shows that there is a kind of “ideological vacuum” experienced by society. At this point, talking about “flaws” of religion can only be bridged through mutual consensus. This means that now and in the future the Pancasila revitalization policy is a necessity for Indonesian history.
President Joko Widodo is certainly aware of the significance of this policy. President Joko Widodo’s first step was to sign Presidential Decree No. 24 of 2016 concerning the Birthday of Pancasila on June 1, 2016. In addition to establishing June 1 as a national holiday, this policy is intended to complete the history of the Indonesian state administration.
In addition, the Seventh President never gets tired of reminding all parties to separate political and religious issues. According to President Jokowi, as he is usually called, the separation is to avoid friction between people.
“Indeed, this is our small friction because of the regional election, because of the gubernatorial election, the choice of the regent, the choice of the mayor, this is what we must avoid,” said the President when inaugurating the ‘Zero Point Monument to the Archipelago Islamic Civilization’ in Barus District, Central Tapanuli, North Sumatra, on March 24, 2017.
Because of that friction, President Jokowi asked no party to mix politics and religion. “Separate properly, so that people know which are religious and which are political,” said the President.
At the end of 2016 there was actually a discourse on the need to form a replacement agency for BP7. It’s just that the realization only materialized on June 7, 2017 with the issuance of Presidential Regulation No. 54 of 2017. This institution was named the Presidential Working Unit for the Stabilization of Pancasila Ideology (UKP-PIP).
However, UKP-PIP was deemed necessary to be perfected. On February 28 2018, President Joko Widodo signed Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2018 concerning the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency. With the change in the form of the work unit into a body form, it is hoped that institutionally BPIP will still exist even if President Jokowi is no longer in power.
The BPIP institution may be a substitute for the BP7 institution. This means, after 18 years since BP7 was disbanded, BPIP as its replacement institution was formed. BPIP has a formidable task: to bring Pancasila to life.
Judging from history, in the Sukarno era it was known as the Manipol-USDEK indoctrination, while in the New Order era it was known as P4. At this point, to what extent has the new formulation been completed, and what are the points that distinguish the new guide from the old guide? The answer is “wait and see!” This formula, the dragons have not yet been fully cooked.
Although, it’s like a house that has not been completely built, as a design framework its shape is starting to become clear. This is at least reflected in the seriousness of President Jokowi to reaffirm the position of Pancasila ideology.
Look, just a month after the establishment of the UKP-PIP institution, President Jokowi issued Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2 of 2017 concerning Social Organizations or popularly referred to as “Perpu Ormas.” At the same time, Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia, which intended to build a Khilafah System in Indonesia, was disbanded.
Even though there were protests, the Perpu on Ormas was passed by the DPR into a law. With the ratification of the Perppu Ormas into law, the government through this regulation has the authority to dissolve mass organizations that have ideologies that are contrary to Pancasila and threaten the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.
Thus, President Jokowi’s policy direction is to reaffirm the ideology of Pancasila with the spirit of compromising the diversity of ethnic, cultural and religious identities in Indonesia, at least for the time being it can be seen as an effort to prevent the potential “clash of culture” or “clash of ideology” and at the same time reposition the position of Pancasila . as a unifying aspect of the nation’s children.
It can be concluded that this is the vision of the policy of revitalizing the ideology of Pancasila if we recall here President Jokowi’s statement: “I am Indonesian, I am Pancasila.” The slogan was created to enliven Pancasila Week 2017 and commemorate the Birthday of Pancasila June 1, 2017.
The slogan is a form of affirmation of the internalization of Pancasila values, which is manifested in an attitude of awareness of transcendence, both as Indonesian human identity and as citizens. This transcendence awareness is an awareness that goes beyond the narrow boundaries of particularism, either in the name of ethnicity or religion or a combination of both, to grow into Indonesian and Indonesian universalism.